scroll to top
0

Mobile Menu

Header Layout

EBSCO Auth Banner

Let's find your institution. Click here.

Page title

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism.

  • Academic Journal
  • Rogowski, Jon C.1 rogowski@fas.harvard.edu
  • Legislative Studies Quarterly. Aug2017, Vol. 42 Issue 3, p355-385. 31p.
  • How do electoral institutions affect legislative behavior? Though a large body of theoretical scholarship posits a negative relationship between multimember districting and the provision of particularistic goods, empirical scholarship has found little evidence in support of this expectation. Using data on the provision of US post offices from 1876 to 1896, a period during which many states elected congressional representatives from at-large districts, and a differences-in-differences approach, I find that counties represented by at-large representatives received approximately 8% fewer post offices. The results have important implications for studying how electoral institutions affect incentives for legislative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Additional Information
Copyright of Legislative Studies Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

banner_970x250 (970x250)

sponsored