scroll to top
Loading icon
0

Mobile Menu

Header Layout

EBSCO Auth Banner

Let's find your institution. Click here.

Page title

Advanced Search Results For "Maug, Ernst"

1 - 10 of 49 results for
 "Maug, Ernst"
Results per page:

When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings.

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Review of Financial Studies; Apr2022, Vol. 35 Issue 4, p1813-1867, 55p

Abstract:Copyright of Review of Financial Studies is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users m...

View details

CEOs Earn Less at More-Prestigious Firms.

Publication Type:Report

Source(s):Harvard Business School Cases. Mar 01, 2022, p1-727. 727p.

Abstract:By an average of 8%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

View details

How Do Executives Exercise Their Stock Options?

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Review of Corporate Finance Studies; Aug2020, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p302-339, 38p

Abstract:Copyright of Review of Corporate Finance Studies is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However,...

View details

Trading and Shareholder Voting.

Publication Type:Report

Source(s):CEPR Discussion Papers; Oct 2019, Preceding p1-57, 58p

View details

Private equity and human capital risk.

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Journal of Financial Economics. Sep2019, Vol. 133 Issue 3, p634-657. 24p.

Abstract:We study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct matched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefu...

View details

Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts.

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Review of Financial Studies; Dec2013, Vol. 26 Issue 12, p3182-3224, 43p

Abstract:Copyright of Review of Financial Studies is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users m...

View details

Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism.

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Review of Finance; Jul2018, Vol. 22 Issue 4, p1251-1289, 39p

Abstract:Copyright of Review of Finance is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, ...

View details

Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay.

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Journal of Finance (Wiley-Blackwell). Feb2007, Vol. 62 Issue 1, p303-343. 41p. 10 Charts, 2 Graphs.

Abstract:We calibrate the standard principal–agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U.S. CEOs. We show that this model predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have l...

View details

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?

Publication Type:Academic Journal

Source(s):Journal of Finance (Wiley-Blackwell). Feb1998, Vol. 53 Issue 1, p65-98. 34p. 2 Charts.

Abstract:This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily....

View details

CEOs Earn Less at More-Prestigious Firms.

Publication Type:Report

Source(s):Harvard Business School Cases. Feb 01, 2017, p1. 727p.

Abstract:By an average of 8%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

View details

banner_970x250 (970x250)

sponsored